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Over 90% of the external relations budget of the EU is processed 
through its external financial instruments. With the Lisbon Treaty 
and the creation of the new European External Action Service (EEAS), 
the institutional architecture of these instruments was significantly 
reformed. This contribution analyses strategic programming both 
pre- and post-Lisbon, identifies ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, and examines 
the potential of the new provisions to increase the coherence of EU 
external action. The examination shows that the instruments can be 
categorised into three groupings: ‘the big three’ comprising the bulk 
of funding characterised by joint programming and responsibilities; 
the ‘Commission-only’ instruments where all powers remain with the 
Commission; and the ‘EEAS-led rest’ in which the High Representative 
and the EEAS play a strong role but only have limited financial 
resources available. The new system calls for strong coordination of all 
involved actors in order to make it work. Findings of a case study on the 
Instrument for Stability reveal, however, that so far the establishment of 
the EEAS has not made a substantial impact on strategic programming 
in its first two years.
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Introduction
One area of external relations in which the EU has traditionally 
played an important role is that of technical and financial 
cooperation with third countries through its external 
programmes. These geographic and thematic financial 
instruments constitute one of the EU’s most important tools for 
shaping its external environment and wielding its influence on 
the international stage. The Treaty of Lisbon started a process 
of institutional restructuring that shifted the competences 
for programming and 
implementation of the 
instruments within the 
EU machinery. The new 
High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy/Vice 
President of the European 
Commission (HR/VP) was 
tasked to ensure ‘the 
unity, consistency and 
effectiveness of the Union’s 
external action, in par-
ticular through the (…)
external assistance instruments’1. This has led to a complex new 
allocation of competences. The new EEAS plays a significant 
role in the strategic programming of certain instruments; 
while simultaneously, the Commission maintains the overall 
authority to manage and implement the instruments. The last 
two years saw intense turf wars between the EU institutions on 
the overall division of competences in this matter. 
The financial instruments of EU external action account for 
more than 90% of its external relations budget expenditure. 
This amounts to €6.9 billion or 6% of the overall EU budget 
in 2011. The 10th European Development Fund adds another 
€22.7 billion to EU development cooperation for the years 
2008-13, but is so far not part of the EU budget.
As a general rule, it is the Commission as the EU’s executive 
branch, which has the competence to execute the budget 
and manage programmes. The main actors in the new 
programming setting are the Commission Directorate-
General (DG) Development and the newly established EEAS2.  
Programming usually includes the following five steps: fund 
allocation, strategy paper, multi-annual indicative programme, 
annual action programme, and implementation. 
The new programming provisions were laid down in the 
Council decision of July 2010 that established the EEAS, 
although the exact distribution of competences between 
the EEAS and the Commission remained unclear in the 
first year of the service. 
Voices in the Commission 
acknowledge that the 
first version of an inter-
service agreement meant 
to settle these issues was 
not very well drafted. It 
took the involved actors 
more than a year after 
the EEAS was officially 
declared operational to 
agree on detailed working 
arrangements between 
the Commission and the 
EEAS. According to who decides on what in the new system, 
the nine instruments can be subdivided into three general 
groupings: the ‘big three’, the ‘Commission-only’ instruments, 
and the ‘EEAS-led rest’.
The ‘big three’ instruments
The first group consists of the three financially best equipped 
geographic instruments: the Development Cooperation 
Instrument (DCI), the European Development Fund and the 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, which 
all share a similar strategic programming procedure. Both 
the Commission and the EEAS share competences like in no 
other group of instruments and the development of the work 
relationship between the two actors will have a significant 
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Figure 1: EU Budget 2011, Heading 4 ‘The EU as a global actor’
Source: European Commission (2012) EU budget 2011 - Financial Report.
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influence on how EU external action is conducted. Significant 
changes took place especially in the part of the DCI which 
finances cooperation with countries in Asia, Latin America, 
the Middle East and South Africa. While the Commission 
succeeded in keeping the competence for thematic funds (e.g. 
for migration, health, environment) under its influence, the 
geographic programming now involves new actors.
In pre-Lisbon times it was solely the Commission’s DG 
External Relations (RELEX) which was in charge of preparing 
strategic documents, under the responsibility of the former 
Commissioner for External Relations (see Figure 2).
Now the EEAS and DG Development share the competence 
to jointly undertake the strategic programming under the 
responsibility of the Commissioner for Development (see 
figure 3) with the EEAS being the lead 
service during the whole process. It is 
apparent that DG Development and 
the Commissioner for Development 
received a significant amount of influence 
over the DCI post-Lisbon which they 
did not previously possess. Although 
all geographical desks responsible for 
programming were transferred to the 
EEAS during its inception, the merger of 
the former DG Development with DG 
EuropeAid has led to the incorporation of 
the geographical units of the latter into 
the new DG. This seems like a duplication 
of programming desks in both EEAS 
and DG Development, but this is to a 
certain degree unavoidable given the 
sole responsibility of DG Development 
for the geographic implementation of 
the financial instruments. In addition, the 
political responsibility for the DCI was not 
given to the HR/VP, as one could have 
expected, but instead to the Commissioner 
for Development. This shows how the 
Commission, supported by the European 
Parliament, tried to keep the political responsibility for the 
instrument in its sphere of influence. At the end of the process, 
however, both the Development Commissioner and the HR/VP 
have to sign the strategic documents and submit them jointly 
to the College of Commissioners for adoption, although it is 
expected it will mostly be the cabinet of the Commissioner 
who is actively involved in the actual programming process, 
e.g. through the coordination of services 
and cabinets.
One interesting detail of the new provisions 
concerns the European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument and points to 
an asymmetric power distribution within 
the Commission. In pre-Lisbon times, 
the competence for the instrument was 
located with the former Commissioner 
for External Relations. The responsibility 
for the instrument was then transferred 
to the portfolio of the Commissioner 
for Enlargement and European 
Neighbourhood Policy by a ‘pre-emptive 
strike’ of Commission President Barroso to 
defend Commission competences vis-à-vis 
the direct influence of EU Member States. 
It is remarkable that the Commissioner 
now has the political responsibility for 
European Neighbourhood Policy, while 
‘his’ DG is only in charge of enlargement 
countries and has neither the staff nor 
the competence to programme the 
neighbourhood instrument. This is instead 
done by the EEAS and DG Development.
The ‘Commission only’ instruments
The second group of financial instruments includes 
instruments that are programmed and managed exclusively 
by the Commission services under the direct responsibility 
of a Commissioner other than the HR/VP. After the inception 
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Figure 2: Key actors and procedures in DCI strategic programming pre-Lisbon
Figure 3: Key actors and procedures in DCI strategic programming post-Lisbon28
of the EEAS, only three instruments remain in the category: 
Instrument for Pre-Accession, Instrument for Humanitarian Aid, 
and the thematic programme of the DCI. The programming 
of, for instance, the Instrument for Pre-Accession is solely in 
the hands of the Commission, with DG Enlargement in the 
lead under the direct responsibility of the Commissioner for 
Enlargement. Not much has changed following the Lisbon 
Treaty concerning the programming procedure. It should be 
stressed that the Instrument for Pre-Accession is completely 
omitted from the influence of the EEAS headquarters. It is 
surprising that the EEAS now has, in general, the leading role in 
the planning of geographic cooperation with 
third countries (e.g. with the Ukraine), with 
only the exception of enlargement countries 
(e.g. Serbia). Whether these provisions help 
to enhance the coherence and efficiency of 
EU external action on an institutional level 
is questionable, although at the practical 
level and from the perspective of the EU 
delegations that carry out crucial planning and 
implementation work ‘in the field’, not much of 
a difference can probably be observed.
The ‘EEAS-led rest’
The third group consists of four instruments – Industrialised 
Countries Instrument, European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights, Instrument for Stability (IfS), and 
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation – which are 
characterised by a strong leading role of the EEAS in terms 
of strategic programming under the direct responsibility 
of the HR/VP. Furthermore, these instruments all have a 
rather limited budget in comparison to the big programmes 
covering development cooperation, and accounted for only 
6.3% of EU external action funds in 2011. Before the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the 
EEAS, it was the competence of the former DG RELEX to draft 
the strategy of these instruments. Today, the services of the 
Commission are no longer substantially involved because 
the competence for strategic programming was transferred 
to the EEAS. It is apparent that the HR/VP has strong authority 
over all stages of programming of the instruments, although 
of course all decisions of the Commission still have to be 
adopted by the College of Commissioners and approved by 
the Member States in the respective comitology committees. 
Implications for policy coherence
The establishment of the EEAS and its new role in strategic 
programming might have a significant influence on the focus 
and direction of EU external action. It is essential to highlight 
that the EEAS incorporates several policy fields of EU external 
action under one roof, but has diverging competences in each 
of them. Ideally the new structures will allow for several fields 
to be combined in order to achieve common objectives and 
thus lead to a more coherent EU external action. This was, 
after all, the main objective to establish the new service in the 
first place: fusing the competences for relevant policy fields, 
strategies and instruments into one service. However, the 
leverage of the EEAS in the fields of, for instance, development 
cooperation, security, crisis response and human rights, 
varies significantly. At the same time, important policy fields 
such as trade and enlargement remain almost completely 
in the Commission’s sphere of influence. This development 
was caused by concerns, especially stemming from the 
supranational institutions, the Commission and European 
Parliament, about a loss of political influence in EU external 
action to the EU Member States.
The new role of the EEAS and the shift of programming 
competences among the EU institutions could yet also have 
adverse effects for policy coherence. Observers already fear 
that the new role of the EEAS might lead to a ‘securitisation 
of aid’, meaning that instead of pursuing poverty eradication, 
development funds might rather be used to address other 
foreign policy goals. The discussion on the 
military dimension of the African Peace Facility 
financed by the EDF is a prominent example 
of this. Some officials in EU delegations now 
perceive a slight shift of focus towards more 
security-related issues with the inception of 
the EEAS, and name also the Sahel strategy on 
security and development in this regard. As a 
consequence of the involvement of the EEAS 
in strategic programming, the demarcation 
between community and Council actions 
might be blurred, which could in turn lead to 
a more coherent EU external action; but this also carries the 
risk of encroaching on the competences of the Community 
institutions in a similar way as in the ‘ECOWAS case’3.
So far, the HR/VP has not displayed a great interest in 
pushing development policy objectives and has left the 
topic primarily to Development Commissioner Piebalgs. 
Similarly, it seems that for most officials in the EEAS, policy 
coherence for development ranks rather low on their agenda.   
The development cooperation coordination division in the 
EEAS finds it difficult to raise awareness for development 
policy among their colleagues and only has limited resources 
at its disposal to push this policy issue. DG Development 
would have a strong interest in doing that, but because of the 
significant transfer of staff to the EEAS it has lost programming 
expertise without gaining much additional human resources. 
Moreover, on the political level in the Commissioners’ cabinets, 
officials argue that there is no willingness to promote own 
agendas, e.g. development policy, in the portfolios of other 
Commissioners.
New programming structures – business as usual?
When the EEAS became operational the strategy papers of 
most external instruments were already in place. The only 
exception was the new strategy paper for the long-term 
component of the Instrument for Stability4, which was drafted 
mainly in 2011, thus constituting a first test for the strategic 
programming capacity of the EEAS post-Lisbon. Throughout 
the whole process however, significant changes to pre-Lisbon 
times were not observable and working relations between 
officials in the EEAS and the Commission went largely 
unaffected by inter-institutional struggles that simultaneously 
took place at the macro level. One important point to 
consider is that EEAS staff, which is now responsible for the 
Instrument for Stability, consists mostly of the same officials 
that previously had this responsibility in DG RELEX. Interviews 
with staff from EEAS and the Commission reveal that one of 
the main reasons why working relations run smoothly is that 
the officials already know each other, have worked together 
before and are used to the Community procedures applied 
in the Commission. Especially the latter point might be 
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important in the medium term when an increasing number 
of Member States’ diplomats not accustomed to Commission 
working procedures will join the EEAS.
Conclusion
Following the cumbersome process of macro-institutional 
scramble in 2010 and 2011, the true litmus test of the effects 
of the new provisions on the coherence, effectiveness 
and efficiency of EU external action will be the upcoming 
programming cycle for the ‘big three’ instruments. It does 
not seem that the inception of the EEAS and the reshuffling 
of competences have had a significant effect on strategic 
programming in the first two years of the service, but this 
is likely to gradually change from now on. The new political 
allocation of funds to partner countries, led by the EEAS, or the 
strategic objectives of the new documents will hint towards 
the further direction of EU external relations.
Due to the complicated net of responsibilities for the external 
instruments post-Lisbon, strong institutional ties and 
coordination efforts are needed. Above the everyday working 
relations of EU officials, whose effect on coherence may 
diminish with the incorporation of more national officials into 
the EEAS, guidance of the political level of the Commissioners 
and especially the HR/VP is required. The upcoming EEAS 
review by the HR/VP, expected in mid-2013, offers the 
opportunity to better adjust and fine-tune the new structures 
and procedures. Until then, more coordination efforts of the 
Commissioners and their cabinets and more engagement of 
the HR/VP, also in development policy, would help to improve 
the programming of the external financial instruments and 
thus the visibility and effectiveness of EU external action.
Notes
*  Research for this article was conducted during a stay at EIPA from   
  November 2011 to February 2012 in the framework of the Marie   
  Curie ITN‚ ‘EXACT’ on EU external action.
1  Article 9 Council Decision of 26 July 2010.
2  Some observers raised doubts about the legality of equipping   
  the EEAS with programming competences regarding development  
  cooperation instruments (cf. Van Reisen 2010), while others state   
  that the competence allocation is in legal accordance with the EU   
  treaties (cf. Duke, S. and S. Blockmans 2010).
3  In the ECOWAS case (Case C-91/05, ECOWAS) the European   
  Court of Justice found that the Council had encroached upon the   
  development cooperation competence of the European   
  Community when using a CFSP legal base for the support of   
  ECOWAS in the fight against the proliferation of small arms and   
  light weapons (Hillion, C. and R. A. Wessel 2009).
4  The IfS is split in a short-term (crisis response and preparedness)   
  and a long-term component (e.g. counteracting global and   
  trans-regional threats) of which only the latter is programmable.   
  Responsibilities for the instrument are distributed between   
  the EEAS, DG Development and the new Foreign Policy Instrument  
  Service which is legally part of the Commission but co-located   
  with the EEAS.
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